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Abstract
This study employs an error-correction SETAR model to analyse the
non-linearities in the behaviour of the mark-up on costs charged by the
filling stations in the New York metropolitan area. While usual price
transmission gained significant attention in the literature, the mark-up
portion of the price has not been analysed to date. The results indicate
that the adjustment to mark-ups to their long run values is non-linear,
but the speeds with they adjust to their long-run values are equal across
regimes for two out of three series analysed. For one of the series the
adjustment is beneficial for the end consumers such that prices fall faster
than they rise. The findings are somewhat surprising, indicating that there
is no need for government intervention in the NY petroleum market.1
JEL Classification: C52, D4, L11, Q40.
Keywords: Rockets and feathers, asymmetry, petroleum, SETAR.
1 Introduction
This paper analyses the non-linearities in the behaviour of the cost items in
the local market for petroleum in the New York area. A SETAR model of the
class proposed by (Tong (1978) and Tong & Lim (1980)) is used to analyse the
reversion of the mark-up on costs charged by the filling stations to its long run
equilibrium level. This approach allows us to check for the responses of the
petrol prices to upstream price changes and verify the old claim that petrol
prices ”rise faster than they fall”. Karrenbrock (1991) presents an impressive
list of excerpt from newspapers quoting drivers and officials outraged at the
behaviour of the petrol prices.
Non-linearities in the speed of adjustment to the upstream prices have at-
tracted a significant attention, both from applied researchers and from gov-
ernmental agencies. Since non-linearities in transmission might involve welfare
transfer from agents downstream / end users to companies upstream, the pub-
lic agencies vigorously pursued this issue - see reports by General Accounting
Office (1993) for US, Competition Bureau (1997) for Canada, and Monopolies
and Mergers Comission (1990) and Office of Fair Trading (1998) for the UK. .
1Special thanks to Michael J. Dueker, Assistant Vice President, Federal Reserve St. Louis
for useful comments.
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This phenomenon is more formally referred to as ”asymmetric price trans-
mission”. The graphic term usually used in this context ”rockets and feathers”
was coined by Bacon (1991) to describe fast increases in downstream prices
following upstream increases- rockets launched, and slow decreases following
upstream price decreases - feathers falling. The difference between asymmet-
ric and symmetric price transmissions is illustrated in the lower right panel in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Examples of symmetric (lower left panel) and asymmetric (lower right
panel) price transmission
The existence of asymmetric price transmission implies that by postponing
lowering the prices, agents artificially increase their margins causing the above-
mentioned welfare transfer. This usually forms the most typical motivation for
formal research as it might result from tacit or even formal collusion or serious
problems with the degree of competition Godby, et al. (2000).
Previous studies into the area had several common shortcomings. Firstly,
researchers used prices aggregated in terms of geographical markets (e.g. on a
national level), frequency (e.g. monthly averages), products (e.g. aggregated
unleaded petrol) or market stage (e.g. from refiners directly to filling stations)
or cost items (e.g. prices including taxes or net of country-wide taxation rate)
Frey & Manera (2005). Secondly, the testing framework used implies that asym-
metric price transmission was analysed with respect to changes in disequilibria
measures, instead of overall profitability (see Section 4.3 for a more formal dis-
cussion). Thirdly, while those studies were utilizing the non-linear time series,
no formal testing for the presence of non-linearities was reported (with the ex-
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ception of Frey & Manera (2005) and Godby et al. (2000)). Finally, although
it was proven that structural changes in the relationship between upstream and
downstream prices can be mistaken for the signs of asymmetric price trans-
mission Cramon-Taubadel & Mayer (2001), studies do not analyse stability of
pricing relationships (with the exception of work by Reilly & Witt (1998)).
The novelty of this study comes from the fact that it tries to approach the
problem of asymmetries in a different manner. Firstly (and most importantly),
instead of focusing on the behaviour of downstream prices, it focuses on the
behaviour of mark-ups on costs, i.e. residual portion of the downstream (retail)
petroleum prices, not coming from upstream wholesale stage. This allowed us
to check for the presence of asymmetric price transmission and also to get some
insight into behaviour of adjustment of mark-up on costs towards its long-run
equilibrium.
Secondly, data used offer a distinct improvement as (i) it is constrained to
only one geographically distinct market (greater New York metropolitan area),
(ii) instead of using product aggregates, it focuses on three distinct kinds of
petrol (regular, midgrade and premium unleaded petrol), (iii) prices are quoted
on a particular point in time, thus representing true market outcome, rather
than average over days or weeks, (iv) data focuses on one transmission stage
only (from New York harbour warehouses to New York filling stations), which
is more likely to result in a stable pricing relationship. As demonstrated by
Geweke (1978) aggregation over time can create a type of omitted variables
bias resulting from insufficient lag structure and result in finding asymmetries
in symmetric processes Bachmeier & Griffin (2003).
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the motivation
for the research. Section 3 summarizes framework for testing for the presence
of asymmetric price transmission, Section 4 presents overview of data, Section
5 presents the results of empirical application of non-linear analysis. Summary
and description of further research follows.
2 Motivation
2.1 Focus
Most of the research into pricing on the petroleum markets was focused on
the ”rockets and feathers” phenomena i.e. on answers of downstream prices to
upstream price changes (see section 2.2). The behaviour of other costs was com-
pletely excluded from the analysis and the behaviour of margins was analysed
only indirectly, through an analysis of market disequilibria, which were expected
to squeeze the margins Abdulai (2002). This approach has its virtues (most im-
portantly it allows us to directly address the issue of interest, i.e. whether
downstream consumers can enjoy upstream price decreases as quickly as they
have to suffer upstream price increases), but it focuses only on one element of
the market.
This paper focuses on the behaviour of residual costs (not coming from
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upstream). Focusing on this portion of the price allows for:
• testing for the presence of asymmetric price transmission. When mark-
up portion of the price increases faster than it decreases it means that
downstream prices rise faster than they fall, and
• gaining some insight into how agents behave - by analysing their margins,
expenditure on marketing, etc.
2.2 Overview of Research Focused on Rockets and Feath-
ers
This section deals with studies on the North American markets, for comprehen-
sive review of other markets see Frey & Manera (2005).
In perhaps the first study for the US market, Karrenbrock (1991) employed
monthly data for 1983-1990 to study the empirical relationship between whole-
sale and retail petrol prices regressing downstream price changes on positive and
negative upstream prices (but not in the ECM fashion, i.e. without an error
correction term). Both prices used were reduced by the sum of the federal petrol
tax and average of the 50 states petrol tax. He found that the length of time in
which a wholesale price increase is fully reflected in the retail petrol price is the
same as that of a wholesale decrease for premium and unleaded regular petrol.
The null hypothesis of symmetric transmission was not rejected. It was con-
cluded that, contrary to commonly held belief that drivers do not benefit from
wholesale petrol price decreases; these are passed along as fully and quickly as
are wholesale price increases.
Shin (1992) applied model by Karrenbrock (1991) to the analysis of the US
crude-wholesale price transmission, using monthly data over the period 1986-
1992. He estimated a model with only contemporaneous price effects (i.e. re-
gressed upstream changes on downstream increases and decreases. Results show
that crude oil price variations have a symmetric impact on the wholesale market.
Another study concerned with asymmetric transmission in the USA was by
Borenstein, et al. (1997). For their analysis of price transmission between 1986
and 1992, they used weekly data on prices of West Texas Intermediate crude oil,
prices of generic petrol in New York and the Gulf Coast, average price of branded
petrol sold at terminals in 33 cities east of the Rocky Mountains, average prices
of unleaded regular self-service petrol net of all taxes in those cities. After
testing for the homogeneity of the contemporaneous change in the upstream
price in all of the transmissions they estimated, they proceeded with two-stage
LS estimation. Using ECM framework (but with short-run adjustment variables
split between upstream increases and decreases, they confirmed that retail petrol
prices respond more quickly to increases than to decreases in crude oil prices.
The adjustment takes approximately 8 weeks in case of decrease in crude oil
prices but only 4 weeks in case of increase in prices of crude oil. However, the
results of tests for equal speeds of adjustments to increases and decreases were
not presented.
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Balke, et al. (1998) extended the work of Borenstein et al. (1997) using dif-
ferent model specification. They used data from January 1987 through August
1996 on weekly prices of West Texas Intermediate crude, spot prices for unleaded
petrol in the New York harbour, wholesale price of petrol and retail prices of self-
service unleaded motor spirit with and without taxes. After finding out that
their series are stationary, they proceeded with analysis of Granger-causality
and sources of variance. They established that upstream prices Granger-cause
downstream prices at all stages of the distribution chain. The results of bivari-
ate vector autoregressive models for each pair suggested that with one exception
(relationship between spot price of crude oil and wholesale spot price of petrol)
price shocks originate upstream and are transmitted downstream. The null of
symmetry in transmission was rejected in nine of ten price pairs (except for spot
retail transmission).
Godby et al. (2000) used weekly data on self-service regular and premium
patrol net of taxes and Edmonton par and Montreal Brent crude oil cost for the
period January 1990 to December 1996 for 13 Canadian cities. They applied
bootstrap procedure by Hansen (1996) to test the null hypothesis of a linear
formulation against an asymmetric alternative. The test was based on bootstrap
critical values of a Wald type heteroskedasticity-consistent tests. Only weak
signs of asymmetry were found Godby et al. (2000, p. 364) . This was attributed
to the frequency of the data used and to the fact that previous studies used
aggregate data on prices from distinct regions.
Bachmeier & Griffin (2003) revisited data by Borenstein et al. (1997) using
high frequency (daily and weekly) data, and larger sample (from February 1985
to November 1998). Their results indicate that daily retail prices adjust almost
instantaneously and symmetrically to crude oil price changes.
The research by Eckert (2002) was inspired by the cyclical behaviour of
downstream prices in Ontario, Canada, which might be mistaken for asymme-
tries. The testing was conducted in a tradition of Borenstein et al. (1997), with
the use of quarterly dummies and three level shifts accounting for the first Gulf
war. In such model, the null symmetry in transmission was rejected. After
ascertaining that asymmetric transmission is present, the more sophisticated
model of price cycles was estimated with the use of two stage procedure (probit
estimation of switching parameters and OLS estimation of logarithms of down-
stream price change module on downstream and upstream price levels). The
results were interpreted as a proof that changes in both regimes were dependent
on upstream prices and were decreasing functions of margins. After analysing
those results, Eckert (2002, p.74) concludes that asymmetries between different
portions of the price cycle described by Maskin & Tirole (1988) can be mistaken
for asymmetries in price responses ”rockets and feathers”.
In a more recent paper, Radchenko (2005b) analyzed the link between oil
price volatility and the asymmetric response of petroleum prices to oil price vari-
ations. Weekly data from March 1991 to February 2003 was used to compute the
impulse response functions to crude price increases and decreases. Results show
that the response of retail prices to changes in crude oil prices is asymmetric. In
a different study, Radchenko (2005a) applied a similar model to geographically
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aggregated (region-wide) weekly data from March 1991 to February 2003. Im-
pulse response functions were again used and the spot-retail price transmission
mechanisms were found to exhibit asymmetries.
3 Traditional models in analysis of mark-up be-
haviour
3.1 Relationship between prices
In order to analyse asymmetries in petroleum pricing it is necessary to explain
responses of downstream prices to changes upstream. One model to capture
changes in the downstream prices is:
yt = yt−1 + γ0(y∗t−1 − yt−1) + νt (1)
where y∗t is the equilibrium upstream price, yt is the actual upstream price
and γ0 is adjustment speed (a shock to yt−1 = y∗t would linger forever if γ0 = 0 or
would be eliminated at once if γ0 = 1). The equilibrium prices (y∗t ) is established
based on the long-run relationship between upstream and downstream prices,
i.e.:
y∗t = β0 + β1xt + ²t (2)
where xt is the downstream price, β1 is the proportion of downstream costs
passed through upstream and ²t represents shocks to the system.
Approach by Engle & Granger (1987) combines the above and might be
estimated to analyse the adjustment of downstream prices:
∆²ˆ(j)t = γ0²ˆ
(j)
t−1 +
m∑
i=1
γi∆²ˆ
(j)
t−i + ν
(j)
t (3)
where ²ˆt are OLS residuals from level price equation, γ0 is the speed of adjust-
ment and
∑m
i=1 γi∆²ˆ
(j)
t−i is the lagged left-hand side variable.
In this two-stage cointegration analysis, the existence of the long-run rela-
tionship between prices in question is done by testing H0 : γ0 < 0, i.e. tradi-
tional cointegration analysis. On the basis of that, it is assumed that upstream
and downstream prices are related, and that residuals proxy the disequilibria to
the system. This forms the basis for testing for asymmetric price transmission
Abdulai (2002).
3.2 Non-linear Modelling
Given such model formulation, it is assumed that the residuals ²ˆt proxy changes
to margins earned (positive residuals correspond to bigger margins, while neg-
ative residuals indicate squeezed margins, see Frey & Manera (2005) for an
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overview of non-linear models applied to studies of asymmetric price transmis-
sion). Based on the analysis of those residuals, researchers look for the signs of
the presence of asymmetric price transmission.
Analysis of asymmetric price transmission focuses on non-linear (piece-wise
linear) models of the threshold class (Tong (1978) and Tong & Lim (1980)).
The idea is that (because of the menu costs, transaction costs, search costs,
etc.) pricing decisions follow two regimes2 depending on market characteristics.
In such setting the piece-wise linear model can capture the differences be-
tween regimes and establish the presence of asymmetric price transmission. Such
piecewise linear extension of (3) into two different regimes is:
∆²ˆt =
{
γ
(L)
0 ²ˆt−1 +
∑m
i=1 γ
(L)
i ∆²ˆt−i + ν
(L)
t when ²ˆ
(j)
t−d(j) < r
(j)
γ
(H)
0 ²ˆt−1 +
∑m
i=1 γ
(H)
i ∆²ˆt−i + ν
(H)
t when ²ˆ
(j)
t−d(j) ≥ r(j)
(4)
where ²t−d is the self-exciting threshold variable with delay set to d. The
estimation of threshold parameters and slope variables should be done via a
grid search (as advised by Hansen (1997) and Tsay (1998)), i.e. over all possible
values of thresholds and over all possible lags d and r so as to minimize sum of
squared residuals from a fitted model, i.e.:
(r, d) = argmin
r,d
RSS(r, d) (5)
To avoid trivial results, as advised by Hansen (1997) the extreme values of
threshold variables should be excluded from the estimation.
The last remaining task is to test for the presence of piecewise linear adjust-
ment, i.e. for the presence of asymmetric price transmission. This boils down
to testing of H0 : (∀iγ(L)i = γ(H)i )), i.e. of no significant difference between
parameters in each of the regimes. As recommended by Hansen (1997), this
could be done with Wald test in the following form:
F12 = n ∗ RSS1 −RSS2
RSS2
(6)
where:
• RSS1 is the RSS from (3);
• RSS2 is the RSS from (4);
• n is the sample size.
As noted by Hansen (1996), since the threshold parameter is not identified
under the null, the asymptotic distribution of F12 is not standard, but can be
bootstrapped by the following procedure. Denote u∗t ∼iid N(0; 1), (i) draw u∗t ,
(ii) regress u∗t on right hand side variables from (3) and obtain residual variance
2The author knows no study dealing with 3 or more regimes
7
RSS∗1 , (iii) regress u
∗
t on right hand side variables from (4) obtain residual
variance RSS∗2 , (iv) calculate (6), repeat (i)-(iv) a large number of times and
use sample quantiles as critical values.
In the setting described above, the process of eliminating the disequilibria
determine the adjustment of downstream prices to upstream price changes. In
non-linear framework, those disequilibria are eliminated in regimes (H) and (L)
with different speeds which gives rise to non-linearities - phenomena of prices
rising faster than they fall occur when positive disequilibria (corresponding to
times of decreasing upstream prices) are eliminated at a slower pace than neg-
ative disequilibria (corresponding to time of increasing upstream prices).
Modelling of mark-up on costs, added at a given transmission level, is essen-
tially the same traditional models described above, the only difference is that
it is assumed that upstream costs are fully passed downstream (β1 = 1 which
given the vertical span between tiers is a viable assumption) so that the resid-
ual between upstream and downstream prices (mark-up) comprises retailers’
margins and other costs (mainly marketing). As such, (2) becomes:
yt = pit + xt + νt (7)
where pit represents the mark-up, and the problem of adjustment of down-
stream prices to upstream price changes (i.e. elimination of disequilibria) is
simplified to the problem of adjustment of pit to its long run level:
pit = pit−1 + γ0(pi∗t−1 − pit−1) + νt (8)
where (since it is assumed that mark-up on costs is constant and does not
depend on upstream prices) pi∗t = α+ ²t. Now analysis of disequilibria in mark-
up ²ˆt can be done just as in (3) and (4).
4 Petroleum Product Prices
4.1 Overview of the Data
Weekly retail data from June 2000 until December 2005 was obtained from
Energy Information Agency (the sample includes all the data points available).
Those series represent prices charged for three grades of petroleum products in
approximately 900 retail outlets. The prices are published by 5:00 P.M. Monday,
except on government holidays, when the data are released on Tuesday (but still
represent Monday’s price). The reported price includes all taxes and is the pump
price paid by a consumer as of 8:00 A.M. Monday. This price represents the
self-serve price except in areas having only full-serve.
Daily spot prices for New York area from June 2000 until December 2005
were obtained from Energy Information Agency. Series include wholesale prices
quoted on a day when retail prices was collected. When data on wholesale prices
for a given day was not available, the previous day’s prices were used.
The series analysed include:
8
• downstream prices:
– y1t - NYC / harbour regular all formulations / reformulated retail
petrol prices net of all taxes. Regular petroleum is petroleum having
an octane rating greater than 85 and less than or equal to 90;
– y2t - NYC / harbour midgrade all formulations / reformulated re-
tail petrol prices net of all taxes. Midgrade petroleum is petroleum
having an octane rating greater than 88 and less than or equal to 90;
– y3t - NYC / harbour premium all formulations / reformulated retail
petrol prices net of all taxes. Premium petroleum is petroleum having
an octane rating greater than 90.
• xt - upstream prices - New York harbour reformulated regular petrol.
Figure 2 presents the retail and wholesale prices over the sample period. As
Figure 2: Series analysed.
discussed in (4), the differences between upstream prices result mainly from costs
of additives and enhancements, some of which (but not all) might be assumed
as constant over time (some however, especially costs of ethanol change in line
with upstream prices). This is supported by the analysis of product spreads,
which do not change by more than 3-5 cents over the sample size.
New York data was chosen for the purposes of the analysis as:
• New York metropolitan area constitutes economic hub on the East Coast;
• bulk of trade in wholesale petrol takes place in that area (with NY harbour
prices being benchmark for the entire East Coast.
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The usage of spot regular petroleum prices as proxy for upstream prices
is justified as (i) New York harbour is a central supply hub for Greater New
York Metropolitan area, (ii) regular petroleum forms the basis most retailers
use to create and price premium and midgrade varieties (this is done with use
of additives and enhancements which RFA (2006) increase octane index and
help to differentiate petroleum products and create company-specific fuels, such
as Formula, Silver Eagle, etc.). As seen on Figure 3, costs of wholesale petrol
constitutes majority of downstream prices (the rest is cost of transportation,
additives, marketing, costs of the day-to-day operations of the filling stations
and profits)
Figure 3: Share of upstream prices in final product price.
4.2 Analysis of the Data
Before moving to application of non-linear models, series were analysed for the
presence of unit roots, direction of causality and presence of the cointegration
vector. The price series analysed were not subject to logarithmic transforma-
tion. Borenstein et al. (1997) pointed out that using logarithms implies that
wholesale-retail margin increases with the upstream price. As an alternative
he proposed using the raw data, which implies constant nominal margin in the
level equation. Borenstein et al. (1997, p. 312) claims that for short sample
with moderate inflation such adjustment is justifiable.
The direction of causality was tested with the use of the Granger test (i.e.
it was tested whether the past values of zt are useful for predicting wt once wt’s
history has been modelled. The null hypothesis is that the last week’s value of zt
do not help in predicting the value of wt. Table 1 presents the results indicating
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that upstream prices indeed drive downstream prices not the other way around
(null that history of downstream prices cannot be used to explain upstream
prices is not-rejected, while the reverse is rejected with all force). Series were
Table 1: Granger Causality tests for series analysed.
F-statistic p-value
y
(1)
t → xt 0.02 0.89
y
(2)
t → xt 0.00 0.99
y
(3)
t → xt 0.01 0.93
xt → y(1)t 110.06 0.00
xt → y(2)t 111.51 0.00
xt → y(3)t 110.63 0.00
tested for unit roots using the standard ADF test in the following form:
∆zt = γ0zt−1 + . . .+ υt
∆∆zt = γ1∆zt−1 + . . .+ υt
(9)
where:
• γ0 is the DF variable of interest in the level estimation;
• γ1 is the DF variable of interest in the first difference estimation;
• . . . stand for lagged left hand side variables (order determined to maximize
AIC).
Table 2 presents the results of estimation of (9).3
Table 2: ADF tests for series analysed.
Variable Estimate Std.Error t-stat p-value
xt−1 −0.02 0.02 −1.64 0.10
∆xt−1 −1.16 0.06 −19.35 0.01
y
(1)
t−1 −0.00 0.01 −0.51 0.10
∆y(1)t−1 −0.80 0.06 −13.30 0.01
y
(2)
t−1 −0.01 0.01 −0.74 0.10
∆y(2)t−1 −0.80 0.06 −13.27 0.01
y
(3)
t−1 −0.01 0.01 −0.64 0.10
∆y(3)t−1 −0.63 0.09 −7.09 0.01
3Critical values from Banarjee (1993, Table 4.2, p. 103).
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The existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between prices was
tested using the Phillips-Ouliaris test Phillips & Ouliaris (1990), with trun-
cation parameter set to 2. According to Phillips & Ouliaris (1990, p. 165)
this test should have better power than ADF and PP tests, at least in larger
samples. As shown in Table 3, the null of no cointegration was rejected with all
force for all price pairs.4 It is in line with previous research - see Bachmeier &
Griffin (2003) who also found full pass-through using disaggregated data.
Table 3: Phillips-Ouliaris tests for the null of no cointegration in the series
analysed.
Cointegration Pair Statistics P-Value
y
(1)
t , xt −60.3520 0.01
y
(2)
t , xt −59.7279 0.01
y
(3)
t , xt −59.7693 0.01
After ascertaining that series cointegrate, (2) was estimated for all series.
Table 4 presents the results.
Table 4: OLS estimation of the series analysed.
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
β
(1)
0 27.8661 2.0896 13.34 0.0000
β
(1)
1 0.9372 0.0199 47.03 0.0000
β
(2)
0 35.8471 2.1328 16.81 0.0000
β
(2)
1 0.9520 0.0203 46.80 0.0000
β
(3)
0 41.7649 2.1690 19.26 0.0000
β
(3)
1 0.9687 0.0207 46.83 0.0000
Results confirm that upstream costs are passed downstream , thus confirm-
ing views presented in industry publications and previous studies. The notion
of upstream and downstream prices being related is supported some of the ear-
lier studies of US markets (Karrenbrock (1991), Duffy-Deno (1996), Balke et al.
(1998), Energy Information Agency (1999), Borenstein et al. (1997)). However,
this is not in line with some of the earliest studies, which were not based on coin-
tegration analysis, e.g. Shin (1992). The stability for the relationship was also
analysed and confirmed using CUSUM/CUSUMSQ tests. This is important, as
Cramon-Taubadel & Mayer (2001), showed via Monte Carlo experiments, that
SETAR class of models tends to mis-identify structural breaks occurring in the
data as the signs of asymmetric price transmission.
4The p-values are interpolated from Phillips & Ouliaris (1990, Table Ia and Ib, p. 189).
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4.3 Mark-up on petroleum products
This application uses different approach. Instead of analysing changes to market
disequilibria, it analyses long-run mark-up on costs on a given transmission
level, calculated as a a difference between upstream and downstream prices and
deviations from its long-run level;. This approach has its virtues given that:
• upstream prices are the major variable cost that filling stations face;
• it allows us to get further insight into market;
• the data is constrained to one geographically distinct market (New York
City), and only one transition stage.
The virtue of this approach is that instead of analysing disequilibria, more
detailed proxies for mark-up on upstream costs on a transmission stage could
be used. While this difference might seem not that significant, it allows us
to pose the research question differently - instead of asking what disequilibria
trigger non-linearities, one can ask what levels of profitability trigger different
market responses.
The proxies for the mark-up on costs on each product were calculated as:
pˆi
(j)
t = y
(j)
t − xt (10)
Figure 4 presents the mark-up earned on particular products analysed in this
article.
Figure 4: Mark-ups on products.
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To analyse the long-run equilibrium mark-up (assumed to be constant and
equal to α), the following equation was estimated:
pˆi
(j)
t = α
(j) + ²(j)t (11)
for each of the series (i.e., for j = 1, 2, 3). Table 5 present the results.
Table 5: Estimation of Long-run level of mark-up proxies pˆi(j)t .
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
α(1) 21.6146 0.6698 32.27 0.0000
α(2) 31.0668 0.6786 45.78 0.0000
α(3) 38.6502 0.6861 56.33 0.0000
Furthermore, stability of the relationship given by (11) was investigated with
the use of CUSUM model. Figure 5 presents the results. Graphs show that LR
equilibrium level of mark-up proxied by α(j) is fairly stable over the sample size
at 5%. Also empirical fluctuation test applied in the OLS-CUSUM and recursive
flavours supported the null of stable parameters.
5 Non-linearities in mark-up behaviour
Residuals from (11) were used to establish the reversion process for the mark-up
proxies. The search was conducted with maximum m equal to 12, equal number
of observations in each model and was based on AIC criteria.5 Table 6 presents
the results of estimation of (3).
Table 6: Estimation of linear model of adjustment for pˆi(j)t .
Variable Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
²ˆ
(1)
t−1 −0.2455 0.0386 −6.36 0.0000
∆²ˆ(1)t−3 0.1469 0.0567 2.59 0.0101
²ˆ
(2)
t−1 −0.2404 0.0383 −6.28 0.0000
∆²ˆ(2)t−3 0.1437 0.0569 2.53 0.0121
²ˆ
(3)
t−1 −0.2410 0.0380 −6.34 0.0000
∆²ˆ(3)t−3 0.1498 0.0570 2.63 0.0090
∆²ˆ(3)t−9 0.0837 0.0573 1.46 0.1454
Based on AR order established in (3), equation (4) was estimated for all
three series so as to assess the speed of adjustment of mark-ups to their long-
run values. Table 7 summarizes results for models estimated (r(j) stands for
5The analysis was also performed for other values of m, the results were not changed.
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Figure 5: CUSUM test of stability of parameters in 5.
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threshold, d(j) for delay parameter, F12 for linearity test advocated in Hansen
(1996), calculated using 2000 replications. To avoid trivial results, in the grid the
top and bottom 15% threshold values were disregarded. Furthermore, thanks
to that each of the regimes contained at least 15% observations, which allows
us to get reliable parameter estimates.
Table 7: Overview of SETAR models - structure of models
Variable d(j) r(1) F12
∆²ˆ(1)t 11 8.902501 16.59906∗
∆²ˆ(2)t 11 9.322401 19.34938∗
∆²ˆ(3)t 8 10.61444 52.24798∗
Table 8 presents the results of estimation of (4) for each of the series.
Table 8: Estimation of non-linear model of adjustment for pˆi(j)t .
Variable Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
²ˆ
(1,L)
t−1 −0.2587 0.0414 −6.25 0.0000
²ˆ
(1,H)
t−1 −0.1814 0.1147 −1.58 0.1147
∆²ˆ(1,L)t−3 0.1879 0.0701 2.68 0.0078
∆²ˆ(1,H)t−3 0.0752 0.0975 0.77 0.4408
²ˆ
(2,L)
t−1 −0.2441 0.0405 −6.02 0.0000
²ˆ
(2,H)
t−1 −0.2488 0.1258 −1.98 0.0490
∆²ˆ(2,L)t−3 0.1816 0.0701 2.59 0.0102
∆²ˆ(2,H)t−3 0.0688 0.0982 0.70 0.4842
²ˆ
(3,L)
t−1 −0.1832 0.0410 −4.47 0.0000
²ˆ
(3,H)
t−1 −0.5111 0.0947 −5.40 0.0000
∆²ˆ(3,L)t−3 0.0939 0.0604 1.55 0.1214
∆²ˆ(3,H)t−3 0.4183 0.1608 2.60 0.0098
∆²ˆ(3,H)t−9 0.0774 0.0697 1.11 0.2683
∆²ˆ(3,H)t−9 0.1329 0.1042 1.27 0.2035
The results show that non-linearities in the pricing behaviour do exist. How-
ever, the nature of non-linearities is interesting in a number of ways. Firstly,
note that the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium level of
mark-up (as opposed to carry-on effect) is given by the coefficients γ(j,L)0 and
γ
(j,L)
0 respectively. Results reported in Table 8 indicate that the speeds of ad-
justment are:
• similar for regular and midgrade petroleum (in fact the F-test failed to
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reject null hypothesis of H0 : γ
(j,L)
0 = γ
(j,H)
0 for j = 1 (regular petroleum)
and j = 2 (midgrade) with p-values 0.5266 and 0.9717 respectively);
• much higher for regime H in the case of premium petrol (the F-test re-
jected the null of equal speeds of adjustment with p-value of 0.0017);
As a next step the time distribution of regimes was analysed. Figure 6
presents the series analysed (with solid circles correspond to H regime). The
trend visible is that mark-up reverts to its long-run level faster when the dis-
equilibrium was large and positive (so that the downstream prices were above
their long-run levels).
It was observed that clustering of fast-adjustment observations (regime H)
coincided with increases in taxes (marked as solid squares in Figure 6) but not
with decreases in taxes (green triangles). Table 9 presents the percentage of
observations falling into H regime within ±k weeks of the date when taxes were
increased. The results indicate that faster adjustment periods tend to cluster
around changes in taxes.
Table 9: Changes in taxation and clustering of observations in regime H.
k Variable In regime H
±4 ∆²ˆ(1)t 33%
±4 ∆²ˆ(2)t 31%
±4 ∆²ˆ(3)t 24%
±6 ∆²ˆ(1)t 41%
±6 ∆²ˆ(2)t 39%
±6 ∆²ˆ(3)t 33%
±8 ∆²ˆ(1)t 50%
±8 ∆²ˆ(2)t 49%
±8 ∆²ˆ(3)t 43%
6 Summary
Relationships between upstream and downstream prices of petroleum products
in New York area and the behaviour of the mark-up on costs were analysed with
the use of cointegration framework and SETAR(2) model. The results indicate
that:
• adjustment of mark-ups to their long run equilibrium level is non-linear in
the sense that two distinct regimes can be found in the revision process;
• the differences between speeds of adjustments are greater for products
with thin mark-up and the periods of faster adjustments are less frequent;
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• ”ocular econometrics” suggests that change of adjustment regimes is more
likely happen shortly before or after increases in taxation.
The results were obtained using disaggregated data on prices of three distinct
kinds of petrol (regular, midgrade and premium unleaded petrol), constrained to
only one geographically distinct market and one transmission stage (wholesale
to retail). This might be the source of different results as other researchers
used data aggregated (i) geographically - Borenstein et al. (1997) used averages
of many metropolitan areas, Balke et al. (1998) used data aggregated across
many municipal areas; (ii) in terms of products analysed Radchenko (2005b)
and Balke et al. (1998) used crude oil data which are quoted at much higher
transmission tier; (iii) over time Karrenbrock (1991) used monthly data. The
results are similar to those obtained by Bachmeier & Griffin (2003) who also
used disaggregated data but not analysed regime-type behaviour.
Results on application of rigorous testing for non-linearities using detailed
and disaggregated data, proved that ”rockets and feathers” phenomena is not
present. Further studies (possibly also using detailed data) should be made to
establish the same for other areas and put the drivers at ease, after all, prices
(of some products and in New York) fall faster than they rise.
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